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DNA Fingerprinting Evidence: The Road
to Admissibility in California
DNA typing is a forensic technique used to identify genetic ma-
terial found in such crime scene samples as blood, semen, hair
roots, and skin scrapings. The technique, which is heralded as rev-
olutionary, has been admitted into evidence in several states. To
secure long-lasting use of DNA typing in California, the technique
must satisfy the Kelly-Frye test for the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Forensic scientists have long hoped for the ability "to identify the
origin of blood and body-fluid stains with the same degree of cer-
tainty as fingerprints." 1 Now, advances in recombinant deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) research offer scientists the needed tech-
nology.2 DNA is found in the chromosomes of all living beings and
provides a person's genetic blueprint. The same unique blueprint is
found in every cell of a human body.3
The composition of every person's DNA varies, determining eye
color, hair color, and the individuality of a fingerprint.4 This means
an individual's blood, semen, skin, and hair can provide virtual posi-
tive identification at the level of their DNA.' It is a powerful foren-
1. Dodd, DNA Fingerprinting in Matters of Family and Crime, 26 MED. Sci. L.
5 (1986).
2. Budowle, Deadman, Murch & Baechtel. An Introduction to the Methods of
DNA Analysis Under Investigation In The FBI Laboratory, 15 CRIME LABORATORY
DIG. 8, 8 (1988) [hereinafter FBI Laboratory].
3. See Lewis, Witness For The Prosecution, DiscovER, June 1988, at 44, 47.
4. E. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17-8(E), at 602
(1986) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC].
5. Theoretically, positive identification may be made by DNA fingerprinting
with the exception of identical twins. This exception applies throughout this Comment
whenever the identification powers of the technique are discussed. The reason for the
exception is because DNA is packaged into 46 chromosomes, 23 of which are contributed
by the father's sperm and 23 contributed by the mother's egg. As identical twins are
created by the same sperm and egg, they share the same DNA, and thus DNA finger-
sic tool. Dubbed "DNA Fingerprinting" by one company,6 DNA
typing has tremendous potential applications in the identification of
murder or rape suspects by their blood or semen. The testing is also
useful in paternity, immigration, and missing person cases.7 DNA
typing is a significant advance over conventional methods of testing
blood, semen, and hair. The conventional methods can only suggest
that a suspect may belong to a certain class of individuals who may
have committed a crime.8
The technique has been described by forensic scientists as "the
greatest advance in their field since the police at the turn of the cen-
tury began to identify criminals from fingerprints left at the scene of
the crime."9 It has also been said: "What fingerprinting was to law
enforcement at the end of the 19th century, DNA analysis will be at
the turn of this century and beyond."10
DNA typing has already been used in England and several
states. 1 In January of 1988, California Attorney General John Van
de Kamp expressed enthusiasm for DNA typing and its potential
uses in California "but implicitly criticized the prosecutors in five
states who ha[d] already used it to link a suspect to a crime." '12 Van
printing cannot identify differences between samples from identical twins. See Lewis,
supra note 3, at 47.
6. Moss, DNA - The New Fingerprints, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 66.
7. Id.
8. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 46.
9. Connor, Genetic Fingers in the Forensic Pie, NEw SCIENTIST, Jan. 1988, at
31.
10. Begley, Leaving Holmes in the Dust, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1987, at 81 (quot-
ing James Starr of George Washington University, a forensic expert and Cellmark Con-
sultant). DNA Fingerprinting has also been "acclaimed as the biggest advance in the
science of crime detection in a century," N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, § I, at 9, col. 1,
and, as "the most important technological development in this field, because it permits
you to link individuals with crimes when identification is a major issue in most of these
cases." N.Y.L.J. Feb. 24, 1988, § I, at 1, col. 3 (remark by Assistant District Attorney
Paul Der~hannesian, head of Albany County, New York's sex offense unit). Rape cases
are historically the hardest to solve: "Only half the reported rapes end in arrests and only
44 percent of those arrested are convicted, the lowest rate for any violent crime." Mal-
colm, F.B.L Opening Doors to Wide Use of Genetic Tests in Solving Crimes, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1989, at Al, col 1.
11. Most recently, it was reported that courts in 13 states have ruled that DNA
evidence is admissible. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25, 1989, § I, at 4, col.1. Specifically, prosecu-
tors who have successfully introduced the evidence at trial in the U.S. include those in
Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington. The technique
was first used in England in 1985 to find the culprit in a rape case. Thompson, DNA's
Troubled Debut, CAL. LAW., June 1988, at 39, 40, 42 [hereinafter Troubled Debut].
12. Thompson, Authorities Moving Towards Use Of DNA Fingerprints, CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL., Feb. 1, 1988, at 3 [hereinafter Authorities]. Among others who have cau-
tioned against the early introduction of the technique are Cecil Hider, manager of the
California Criminalistics Institute, which is part of the state Department of Justice in
Sacramento, L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. 1, and, Charles McGowan, com-
manding officer of the New York City Police Department's scientific research division,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, § I, at 1, col. 1.
One of the strongest criticisms of the Kelly-Frye standard for the admissibility of sci-
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de Kamp indicated that by 1989 or 1990 his office might back the
use of the technique in a criminal trial, but cautioned: "We have
every opportunity to botch this historic moment. How might we do
that? By getting mesmerized with DNA's potential and slipping into
a counter-productive scramble to rush the technology from labora-
tory to courtroom in record time."13
One year after the California Attorney General advised prosecu-
tors to wait until the reliability of DNA typing was better estab-
lished before introducing it in a criminal trial, 14 he "announce[d]
that DNA is ready to go to court, and ready to win." 16 Even so, he
cautioned prosecutors to proceed slowly in their use of the technique
so that "clear, solid precedents" 16 are established for the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence. Otherwise, an unfavorable appellate ruling on
DNA typing could delay its inevitable acceptance.17 In order to es-
tablish favorable and strong precedents, Van de Kamp stated "the
best possible cases"" must be the first to utilize the DNA typing
technique.19
This Comment introduces the reader to the process of DNA typ-
ing, cases utilizing the technique, and analyzes its admissibility in
California in light of the state's general rule for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. The current rule is derived from the California
Supreme Court's adoption in People v. Kelly 20 of the D.C. Circuit's
holding in Frye v. United States.21
This Comment will examine three recent decisions2 2 in California
entific evidence is that it "results in the exclusion of valuable scientific evidence while the
courts wait for the techniques to gain general acceptance." Note, The Admissibility of
Electrophoretic Methods of Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Stan-
dard, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 773, 780 (1986). Because courts adhering to the Kelly-
Frye rule do not engage in a case-by-case analysis to determine the admissibility of a
scientific technique, see id. at 779, a California appellate court's holding that DNA typ-
ing was not generally accepted would exclude the evidence until proponents of the evi-
dence could show a change in the views of the scientific community toward the tech-
nique. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
13. Authorities, supra note 12, at 3.
14. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 42.
15. San Diego Union, Jan. 26, 1989, A7, col. 1.
16. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 1.
17. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 42.
18. L.A. Daily J., supra note 11.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 94-110, for the first cases to introduce the
technique in California.
20. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
21. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985)(inadequate showing that Kelly-Frye test met), rev'd on other grounds and remanded,
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987); People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242
on the admissibility of electrophoresis which provide a framework for
analyzing DNA typing's admissibility under the Kelly-Frye23 test.
Electrophoresis is another, less sophisticated identification tool uti-
lized by forensic scientists to identify genetic markers found in crime
scene samples such as blood and semen.24
This Comment will conclude that California has much to gain
from DNA fingerprinting. The technique may well recast the crimi-
nal justice system, making it more accurate and efficient. However,
proponents of DNA typing evidence must be prepared for critical
scrutiny of the technique by California appellate courts.
Whenever novel scientific evidence is offered in court, the legal system faces
competing concerns. On one hand, there is a danger that excessive caution
will prevent valuable evidence from being admitted in a timely manner. On
the other hand, there is a danger that evidence accepted quickly and uncrit-
ically will later prove less reliable than promised."
The risks associated with premature acceptance of DNA typing are
particularly high and, based on the electrophoresis experience and
California's adherence to the strict Kelly-Frye standard for admit-
ting novel scientific evidence, appellate courts will most likely vigor-
ously review the technique. In order to meet this scrutiny of DNA
typing, proponents must thoroughly present the evidence for DNA
fingerprinting's admissibility and be prepared to address the appar-
ent problem areas in establishing the general acceptance of DNA
typing, such as the lack of independent validation of the technique,
experts in the field being from the private sector, and verification of
DNA typing with crime scene variables. Otherwise, hasty introduc-
tion could lead an appellate court to hold that the technique does not
satisfy the Kelly-Frye test.
II. THE DNA FINGERPRINTING TEST GENERALLY26
DNA fingerprinting was discovered in 1985 during the study of
Cal. Rptr. 496 (1987) (upheld the admissibility of electrophoretic test results of dried
bloodstains); People v. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 245 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1988) (upheld
the use of the multi-system to obtain electrophoretic test results).
* 23. The rule is referred to as both the Kelly-Frye rule and the Frye-Kelly rule.
See Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 42. Compare id. with 20 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
EvIDENCE § 864 (3d ed. 1986).
24. See SCIENTIFIC, supra note 4, at § 17-8(C).
25. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing- Promising Forensic Technique Needs Ad-
ditional Validation, TRIAL, Sept. 1988, at 64.
26. The following section will discuss the general process of DNA typing as de-
veloped by Alec Jeffreys. For more scientific analyses of the subject, see generally FBI
Laboratory, supra note 2, at 8; Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a
New Technique, 28 JURIMNETRICS J. 455 (1988); Higuchi, Von Beroldingen, Sensabaugh
& Erlich, DNA Typing from Single Hairs, 332 NATURE 543 (1988); Giusti, Baird, Pas-
quale, Balazs & Glassberg, Application of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Polymorph-
isms to the Analysis of DNA Recovered from Sperm, 31 J. FOREN-
380
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other genetic phenomena known as "hypervariable regions."27 The
technique arose by chance from research "that was not aimed specif-
ically at solving practical problems." '28 As of this writing, three pri-
vate laboratories" are engaged in DNA fingerprinting, as well as the
F.B.I. laboratory. 0
The method of obtaining a DNA print varies among labs, but ba-
sically the principles behind the methodologies are constant. The
process begins by extracting the DNA from a specimen of blood,
semen, hair, or skin scraping.31 Once extracted and placed under a
high-power microscope, the DNA appears like a ladder which has
been twisted into a spiral. This structure is called the double helix.
sic Sci. 409 (1986); Kanter, Baird, Shaler & Balazs, Analysis of Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphisms in Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Recovered from Dried Blood-
stains, 31 J. FORENSIC ScL 403 (1986); Gill, Jeffreys & Werrett, Forensic applications
of DNA fingerprints,' 318 NATURE 577 (1985); Jeffreys, Wilson & Thein, Individual-
specific fingerprints' of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985); and Jeffreys, Wilson &
Thein, Hypervariable 'Mini-satellite' Regions in Human DNA, 314 NATURE 67 (1985).
27. Merz, DNA Fingerprints Come to Court, 259 J. Am. MED. A. 2193, 2193
(1988).
28. Dodd, supra note 1, at 5. Dr. Alec Jeffreys developed DNA fingerprinting.
He is a British geneticist and professor of genetics at the University of Leicester,
England.
29. The three private labs providing DNA testing are: Lifecodes in Valhalla,
N.Y.; Cellmark Diagnostics in Germantown, Md.; and Cetus Corp. in Emeryville, Cal.
The three companies specialize in different approaches. Lifecodes concentrates on combi-
nations of single-locus probes, Cellmark on multilocus and single-locus probes, and Cetus
on the dot-blot method (see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text on the use of the
probes in the DNA fingerprinting procedure).
"Basically the three DNA printing approaches differ in the clarity and sensitivity of
the final result, and in the minimal amount of material needed for processing. Prints
made with single-locus or multilocus probes have been compared to a thumbprint and
require at least a drop of blood or similar amounts of other tissue. The dot-blot method is
analogous to a single swirl in a thumbprint; although it provides less information, its
great promise is that it works on minute amounts of DNA." Lewis, Genetics Meets
Forensics, 39 BIOSCIENCE 6 (1989) [hereinafter Genetics].
30. The F.B.I. laboratory began accepting specimens from law enforcement agen-
cies across the country in January of 1989. These specimens, coupled with those submit-
ted by their own agents, meant that over 220 samples had been received by June 1989.
At that time, the Bureau was accepting specimens "only in violent personal crimes with a
specific suspect, or serial rapes or child molestations without a suspect." "To promote the
technology's use, the agency is training 60 local technicians a year to establish local
DNA profiling labs, which cost over $100,000." Malcolm, supra note 10, at § AI, col. 1,
§ B8, col. 1.
The F.B.I. Lab is analyzing all three of the methods utilized by the private companies to
determine the most appropriate one for various forensic situations. See Lewis, supra note
29.
31. The extraction of DNA for typing will undoubtedly raise civil liberties con-
cerns in forced or even voluntary testing procedures. The ACLU is currently studying
these issues. Moss, supra note 6, at 70; see also Marx, DNA 'Fingerprints' May One Day
Be Our National ID Card, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1989, at A14, col. 3.
Within the double helix are four molecules which can be analogized
to chemical building blocks. The sequence of these chemical building
blocks determines an individual's genetic code. 2
Much of a person's genetic code, such as the number of arms and
legs, fingers and toes, etc., remains the same from individual to indi-
vidual, and therefore cannot be used to differentiate sample cell
groups.33 Other areas of the DNA, however, are different from one
person to the next, with each configuration of chemical building
blocks displaying a unique pattern.3 4
These areas are the regions which were being researched when the
process for DNA typing was discovered.35 It is in these regions that
samples provide identification unique to one individual. 36 Enzymes
are used to cut the DNA into sections to facilitate viewing the pat-
tern of these regions.37 The sections are then organized by size, and
the excised fragments neatly aligned.38 At this stage, the "DNA fin-
gerprint" can be analogized to a conventional fingerprint before it
has been dusted.39
To make the actual DNA print, manmade DNA probes are intro-
32. The four chemical building blocks are adenine(A), cytosine(C), guanine(G),
and thymine(T). They make up the sides of the double helix, each chemical building
block only joining with its pair on the other side of the "ladder." A always attaches with
T, and G with C, so that the sequence of building blocks on one strand is always comple-
mented by the sequence on the other strand. See generally Lewis, supra note 3, at 47-48.
33. Id. at 47.
34. Id. These areas are referred to as "junk DNA," as well as "mini-satellites"
and "hypervariable regions." Merz, supra note 27, at 2193.
35. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
36. Merz, supra note 27, at 2193; see also L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, § I, at 1,
col. 3.
37. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 205, at 74-75 (3d ed. Supp.
1987). Restriction enzymes cut the DNA strands whenever they encounter a specific
sequence in the genetic code (the sequence of chemical building blocks in the DNA). The
sites at which a restriction enzyme will chop a length of DNA thus depends on the DNA
sequence; for example, the restriction enzyme Pst 1 always cuts at the sequence CTG-
CAG. Since the restriction enzymes cut the DNA at characteristic locations, restriction
fragments of various lengths are produced, usually in the range of several hundred to
several thousand base pairs of chemical building blocks. The mini-satellite regions, those
unique to every individual, are excised by the restriction enzymes which have cut the
DNA strands at the specified sequences of chemical building blocks or "stable regions"
which flank either end of it. See Merz, supra note 27, at 2193.
38. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 37, § 205, at 74. The sections are organized
through a process called electrophoresis. Electrophoresis is a method to separate particles
for both preparative and analytical studies of macromolecules. The particles are sepa-
rated primarily by their charge and to a lesser extent on the basis of their size and shape.
J. STENESH, DICTIONARY OF BIOCHEMISTRY 95 (1975). DNA restriction fragments are
separated by electrophoresis to make the unique pattern which serves as the identity
profile, or "DNA fingerprint." L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § I, at 3, col. 1. However,
although electrophoresis is a part of the technique for making a DNA print, in the realm
of scientific evidence, electrophoresis refers more specifically to the technique used by
forensic scientists for separating red cell enzymes and serum proteins. See SCIENTIFIC,
supra note 4, § 17-8(C), at 594-95.
39. Lewis, supra note 3, at 49.
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duced to the DNA fragments." The probes are radioactively tagged
and have those sequences of the chemical building blocks that deter-
mine individual traits. They attach themselves to the DNA which
they fit.41
A piece of x-ray film is then placed over the probes which at-
tached to the DNA fragments, and developed. After the film is de-
veloped, black bars on the film mark the location of the probes."2
Since the individual traits encoded by the DNA in these regions dif-
fer from person to person, the bars from each of'the different probes
appear at different locations for each individual. The resulting pat-
tern appears something like a supermarket bar code on groceries."3
This is the unique DNA fingerprint.
The DNA print is an x-ray which can be displayed on a light
box. 44 When the bar codes from two different samples match, the
samples came from the same person.45 In addition to this visual ex-
amination to determine a match, statistics are also employed. By
consulting a database of how frequently a pattern appears, the DNA
evidence is even more convincing.
If DNA from two individuals is compared, the chances are about 20 % that
any given band will appear in both DNA fingerprints. The chances that two
given bands will be present in both samples is 4%. And the chances that all
15 will be present in both are virtually nil: about three in 100 billion - or
somewhat greater than the chance that conventional fingerprints from two
individuals will be identical.4 6
40. Id. In commenting on the exaggerated claims of companies marketing the
DNA typing technique, the type of probe used to locate the DNA segment in a sample is
cited as one possible reason for false identification. Thompson & Ford, supra note 25, at
62.
41. Lewis, supra note 3, at 49.
42. Id.
43. Id. Advocates of the technique say that the appearance of the DNA print in
this fashion is an advantage because it can be explained easily to a jury. "Everyone is
different and we just match them up," said Peter Gill, one of the researchers who devel-
oped the technique. Strauss, DNA Fingerprinting, TECH. REV., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 8.
44. Lewis, supra note 3, at 50.
45. Moss, supra note 6, at 69.
46. L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1985, § I, at 1, 34, col. 1. The odds are measured in
terms of millions or billions to one that two people will have the same genetic pattern.
The figure most often cited is one in 30 billion. Merz, supra note 27, at 2193. Compare
id. with L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § I, at 3, col. 2, 28, col. 2 (the odds that conventional
fingerprints from two individuals will be identical are about one in 64 billion).
However, although a conventional fingerprint may provide more statistically sound
identification than DNA typing evidence, "[tihe [DNA] technique not only helps place
the suspect at the scene of the crime but can also suggest what he or she was doing
there." Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74. Timothy Berry,
an Orlando prosecutor, said: "One may have some plausible explanation for fingerprints
...[b]ut blood, semen, uprooted hair, skin under the fingernails of the victim are some-
Thus, in theory, DNA typing can identify or exonerate an individual
with virtual certainty.
III. UTILIZING DNA FINGERPRINTING IN CASEWORK
A. People v. Andrews
DNA typing can be used to solve violent crimes,41 to determine
paternity, to identify missing persons, and to resolve immigration
disputes. 8 Prosecutors in several states have already introduced
DNA typing in criminal trials. 9 In other cases, lengthy and costly
trials were avoided .by confronting suspects with the DNA typing
evidence.50 Additionally, the DNA evidence has helped defense at-
thing else." Id.
47. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at A9, col. 1. The technique is most applicable in
criminal cases where there has been a violent struggle, leaving behind a biological sample
of the perpetrator, such as blood or hair. Id.
48. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at § 205. While the most dramatic results of
the DNA fingerprinting technique may be at the criminal level, the technique has very
useful applications in these other areas as well. In paternity cases, by comparing the
pattern of a child's DNA to that of its putative parents, paternity can be proven. Report-
edly, disputes are being diverted from the courts altogether as DNA matches determine
who did or did not father a child. Lomhoff, By their DNA, So Shall ye Know Them,
CAL. LAW., Feb. 1987, at 8; see also Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 12, 1988, at 4, col. 1;
Moss, supra note 6, at 66.
In the area of immigration law, DNA fingerprinting is similarily used. In a highly
publicized British case, Alec Jeffreys, the technique's inventor, helped a Ghanaian wo-
man living in the U.K. convince immigration officials that a boy returning to the country
was her son. Officials suspected that the boy was the woman's nephew rather than her
son and blood tests could not rule out this possibility. They refused him entry into Britain
on that basis. At the request of the mother's attorney, Jeffreys did a DNA fingerprinting
test to determine the boy's maternity. This was complicated by the fact that the boy's
father and the woman's sisters were unavailable for testing. Even so, he calculated that
the odds of the woman being the boy's aunt, rather than his mother, were one in 100,000,
demonstrating how DNA fingerprinting could give unequivocal positive evidence of rela-
tionships even in some cases where family members are missing. See generally Begley,
supra note 10, at 81; Miller, DNA Fingerprints To Aid Sleuths, 129 Scl. NEws 390
(1988); Jeffreys, Positive Identification of an Immigration Test-case Using Human DNA
Fingerprints, 317 NATURE 818, 819 (1985).
Missing persons cases can also be aided by this new technology by testing a specimen
presumed to have come from a missing person and comparing the DNA fingerprint to
the .presumed victim's parents. See Moss, supra note 6, at 68 (the case of Bobby Joe
Hunt).
49. "Orlando prosecutors scored the first conviction in the U.S. based on DNA
typing [in November of 1987] in a rape trial [People v. Andrews]; since then it has
figured prominently in more than 150 cases in eleven states." Toufexis, supra note 46, at
74; see also supra note 11 (13 states have held the technique admissible).
50. In addition to those cases which have gone to trial, one company which per-
forms a DNA test, Lifecodes Corp. of Valhalla, N.Y., reports that their company has
done its "DNA-Print" test in about 400 criminal cases, and that about 75 % were rape
cases in which most defendants pleaded guilty after the test identified them as the crimi-
nal. Moss, supra note 6, at 67; see also Merz, supra note 27, at 2194 (in at least two
cases in the United States and three in England, when shown the match between their
DNA fingerprint and the evidence sample, defendants have confessed to crimes).
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torneys exonerate clients."
The first case resulting in a conviction based on DNA typing was
in Orlando, Florida, in November of 1987.52 Tommie Lee Andrews53
was found guilty of rape when DNA of the rapist's semen matched
that of Andrews' blood.5 4 Andrews was accused of being a serial rap-
ist who methodically attacked women in the Orlando area from the
Spring of 1986 until early in 1987.15 The police suspected the rapist
51. In San Mateo, Cal., Deputy District Attorney Kathryn Yolken was con-
fronted with genetic fingerprinting evidence that exonerated a suspect in a rape/kidnap-
ping case, although the victim was "utterly convinced" that Chavez was her assailant.
The District Attorney was faced with the decision of accepting the test results and drop-
ping the charges against Chavez or going to trial and challenging the evidence. This
latter approach, "could draw the ire of other trial prosecutors [because if the challenge
were affirmed on appeal] the ruling could delay by several years what all prosecutors,
including [California Attorney General] Van de Kamp, are eagerly awaiting - the day
when genetic fingerprinting will be routinely used to identify criminal suspects, particu-
larly in rape cases." Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 36-40. In a letter to California
Lawyer, Chavez's attorney, Armando Garcia, reported that the charges against Chavez
had been dropped in a pre-trial conference. Garcia, Troubled Fingerprints, CAL. LAW.,
Aug. 1988, at 7. Florida attorney, Jack Nants, said that the DNA fingerprinting evi-
dence really "tipped the scales" in the decision to drop the rape charges against his
client, Tony Harris, "because the rest of the case was balanced." Christian Sci. Monitor,
April 12, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
52. People v. Andrews, No. 87-1565 (Ninth Judicial Cir. Ct., Orange Co., Fla.,
Division 15, Nov. 6, 1987). The Andrews case was upheld on appeal, providing the first
appellate ruling on the admissibility of the DNA test. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841
(Fla. App. 1988), cert. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989). Andrews was tried for the
rapes of two women using DNA evidence. The first conviction occurred in November
1987 and the second in February 1988. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at Al, A46, col. 1.
One source reported that the Florida County circuit court which heard People v. An-
drews used the Frye standard in holding DNA typing evidence admissible. Lewis, supra
note 3, at 50. However, elsewhere it was indicated that Florida follows the relevancy
approach to admitting scientific evidence (the leading case associated with the relevancy
approach is Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234
So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970)). Giannelli, The Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197, 1133-35 (1980); Note, supra note 12, at 780. The "more liberal relevance
standard [requires] the proponent of the evidence . . . show only that one qualified ex-
pert vouches for the principle." Id. Moreover, on review, the Andrews appellate court
clearly used a relevancy approach. See Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 846-47.
53. Andrews is referred to as both Jimmy Lee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at Al,
col. 1, and Tommie Lee, Lewis, supra note 3, at 46.
54. Lewis, supra note 3, at 51-52.
55. Andrews was very careful. One of his victims reported that, when raping her,
he covered his face with a sheet and tried to wipe the semen from her body when he was
through. In addition to attempting to destroy this evidence, which eventually convicted
him, the victim said that he also walked from room to room before he left her home as if
to make certain he had left no other traces of his presence. Detectives assigned to the
rape cases for which Andrews was a suspect built a profile of a man who "methodically
chose his victims." He watched them, knew the hours they kept, and knew many other
details about their personal lives. Lewis, supra note 3, at 45-46.
of being responsible for some twenty-three incidents of prowling,
breaking into women's homes, and attempted assaults or rapes.5"
Despite their many suspicions, when the police finally appre-
hended Andrews, prosecuting him for these crimes appeared diffi-
cult.57 Andrews was initially tried for the rapes of just two women,
one victim who had briefly seen her assailant's face, and another at
whose house the rapist had left two conventional fingerprints. 58
Vaginal swabs had been taken from both women. Standard foren-
sic tests, comparing Andrews' blood with the semen found in the vic-
tims, could only include him in a broad class of persons who might
have committed the crime. The results fit Andrews, but, at the same
time, also fit thirty percent of the population of the United States. 9
In contrast, a DNA test read that Andrews' pattern could conceiva-
bly appear in only one in ten billion persons."' Thus, in a world pop-
ulation of just over five billion, the odds were that he was the only
individual whose semen matched that taken from the victims'
swabs."1
Andrews' first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable
to reach a verdict.6 2 The judge had ruled the DNA evidence admissi-
ble and x-ray prints were displayed to the jury which clearly showed
that the DNA from Andrews' blood sample matched the sperm
found in the victim. Yet, when the defense challenged the statistic
that only one in ten billion persons could have the DNA print pur-
ported to be Andrews', the prosecutor was not prepared; without a
strong legal counter-argument, he decided to withdraw the statistical
evidence.63 The questioning of the DNA evidence meant that it was
Andrews' word against the victim's, and the prosecution lost.64
Andrews was tried a second time. This time, the prosecution es-
tablished the legal precedence of using statistics to back up forensic
test results.65 In addition, three expert witnesses testified for the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 46.
58. Id. at 50-51.
59. Id. at 46; see also State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St. 3d 19, 30 n.4, 514 N.E.2d
394, 406 n.4 (1987) (Brown, J., concurring) (concurring justice advocates the use of the
DNA comparison test because "the masking problems inherent in ABO blood grouping
and HLA testing are virtually non-existent," which "could have made the issue of the
defendant's guilt or innocence far less murky.").
60. Lewis, supra note 3, at 50.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 50. However, in the retrial of this case, Andrews was convicted. People
v. Andrews, No. 88-1400 (Ninth Judicial Cir. Ct., Orange Co., Fla., Division 15, Feb. 8,
1988).
63. Lewis, supra note 3, at 50.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 52. Population statistics determine the likelihood that two individuals
could have the same DNA pattern. For example, that there was only a one in 10 billion
chance that the sperm collected from the rape victim was not from Andrews. It is very
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prosecution about the DNA test. The defense, however, presented no
expert witnesses.6 The jury returned a guilty verdict and Andrews
became the first person in the United States convicted of a crime
with the help of DNA evidence. 7
Although in this second case conventional fingerprints bolstered
the prosecution's case, the DNA fingerprinting was a "key piece of
evidence"6' 8 because the victim never saw Andrews' face. The identi-
fication of suspects is one of the greatest hurdles a prosecutor faces,
and the DNA typing evidence was determinative because it posi-
tively identified Andrews as the rapist. A defendant can always ar-
gue that conventional fingerprints appeared at the scene lawfully;
however, a biological semen sample in a rape case is much more
difficult to argue away. 9
Andrews was upheld on appeal, providing the first appellate ruling
on the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting. In holding that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in admitting the evidence,7 ° the
appellate court found under a relevancy approach that the DNA
print results would be both helpful to the jury and demonstrated suf-
ficient indicia of reliability for admissibility.71
B. People v. Wesley and People v. Bailey
The Wesley and Bailey cases72 were combined for the purpose of a
pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting. In
these two respective New York cases, one for rape and murder, and
the other for rape, a prosecution motion requiring the defendants to
important that proponents of DNA typing do not overlook establishing the foundation for
admitting statistics from populations to derive databases. Genetics, supra note 29, at 8.
66. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 847 (Fla. App. 1988), cert. denied,
542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
67. See People v. Andrews, No. 87-1565 (Ninth Judicial Cir. Ct., Orange Co.,
Fla., Division 15, Nov. 6, 1987).
68. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
69. "A suspect can always argue that a fingerprint was left when he was on legiti-
mate business," but, "[finding an individual's biological sample at the site of a violent
crime is much more [convincing to a jury]." L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § I, at 3, col. I
(quoting forensic scientist Ed Blake of Forensic Science Associates, an Emeryville, Cal.,
consulting firm). Criminology experts say that the main use of the new test will be in
rape cases because of the "severe limitations on identifying the origin of sperm through
existing techniques and because spermatazoa are largely composed of DNA." Altman,
New DNA Test Offers Biological 'Fingerprints' For Crime Fight" N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1986, at Cl.
70. Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 851.
71. See id. at 849-50.
72. 140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (County Ct. 1988) [hereinafter both
cases will be referred to as People v. Wesley].
provide samples for DNA testing was granted. Moreover, the court
held:
DNA Fingerprinting - its underlying principles, procedures and technol-
ogy - is a scientific test that is reliable and has gained general acceptance
in the scientific community and in the particular fields thereof in which it
belongs - to wit, molecular biology, population genetics and diverse other
branches of genetics, chemistry, biology and biochemistry.73
This decision came after an "extensive and intensive" 74 hearing
"involving nearly a dozen sessions over a six-month period,' 75 which
entailed the calling of four expert witnesses by the proseuction7 6 and
two by the defense." The defense attorney said that if either of his
clients were convicted on the basis of the evidence, "he would proba-
bly challenge the admissibility of the new testing technique and the
results in a post-trial appeal. ' 8
C. People v. Castro
Andrews and Wesley both upheld the DNA fingerprinting tech-
nique. However, "the first serious legal challenge" to DNA finger-
printing was in the Bronx, New York case of Joseph Castro.79 Cas-
tro was accused of killing his neighbor and her two-year-old
daughter.80 "According to the prosecutors, a portion of DNA ex-
tracted from a spot of blood on Castro's watch matched DNA taken
from the murdered mother. The chance of such a match occurring at
random, said scientists called by the prosecution, was 1 in 100
million.""'
In the Castro pretrial hearing though, these claims were seriously
questioned by defense experts."2 Their challenge did not concern the
73. Id. at 332, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
74. Id. at 309, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45.
75. N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1988, at 1, col. 5, at 3, col. 4.
76. The prosecution witnesses were: Dr. Richard J. Roberts, Assistant Director
for Research at the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory on Long Island, N.Y.; Dr. Kenneth
K. Kidd, Professor of Human Genetics, Psychiatric, and Biology at the Yale University
School of Medicine; Dr. Michael L. Baird, Director of Paternity and Forensic Evaluation
for Lifccodes; and Dr. Sandra Nierzwicki-Bauer, Assistant Professor of Biology at the
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d at 318-25, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 651-
55.
77. The defense experts were Dr. Neville Colman, an Associate Professor of Pa-
thology at the Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, and Dr. Richard Borowsky, an Associate
Professor of Biology at New York University. Id. at 318, 329, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 651, 657.
78. N.Y.L.J., July 27, 1988, at I, col. 5, at 3, col. 4.
79. Wall St. J., May 22, 1989, at B4, col. 5. Professor of Social Ecology William
Thompson of the University of California at Irvine said that "[this technology has been
steamrollered through the courts, and now it's beginning to get serious scrutiny." Thomp-
son, A Trial of High-Tech Detectives, TIME, June 5, 1989, at 63 [hereinafter High-
Tech].
80. High-Tech, supra note 79, at 63.
81. Id.
82. The main expert for the defense was Dr. Eric Lander, a geneticist and mathe-
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basic science of DNA fingerprinting, but the reliability of the testing
procedures and the interpretation of the results by Lifecodes, the
company that performed the 1987 DNA fingerprinting test on Jo-
seph Castro's blood."3
These tests results were so convincingly controverted by the de-
fense experts that, ultimately, in an unusual pretrial hearing proce-
dure, both defense and prosecution experts met outside of court to
discuss the admissibility.84 Afterwards, they issued a statement ex-
pressing their doubts concerning the technique. In part, it said that
"'overall, the DNA data in this case are not scientifically reliable
enough to support the assertion' that the blood sample from the de-
fendant's watch came from the murder victim. If the data were sub-
mitted to a scientific journal that required pre-publication review by
scientific peers, 'it would not be accepted.' "85 The prosecution, be-
cause of the position adopted by their experts, "submitted briefs con-
ceding that the tests used in the case are too unreliable to be admit-
ted into evidence." 88
Legal experts say this case will probably have a major impact na-
tionally on DNA fingerprinting.8" The fifteen month pretrial hearing
supposedly brought forth numerous deficiencies in the DNA finger-
matician at Whitehead and Harvard University. Schmeck, DNA Findings Are Disputed
By Scientists, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1989, at BI, col 6, B12, col. 1. Dr. Lander acknowl-
edges in his own article, which in part gives a scientific account of the pitfalls of the
DNA testing in Castro, that the defense in the case "was a joint effort with my col-
leagues Howard Cooke, Lorraine Flaherty, Conrad Gilliam, Phillip Green and David
Page, together with attorneys Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck." He "also thank[ed]
Richard Roberts for his efforts to help resolve this meeting and Carl Dobkin for partici-
pating in the experts' meeting." Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE
501, 505 (1989).
83. See Schmeck, supra note 82, at BI, col. 6; see also Lander, supra note 82, at
501 (a detailed commentary on why "DNA forensics sorely lacks adequate guidelines for
interpretation of results").
84. See Lander, supra note 82, at 504.
85. Schmeck, supra note 82, at B12, col. 4. The four scientists who issued the
statement were Dr. Eric Lander, Dr. Richard Roberts of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
on Long Island, Dr. Carl Dobkin of the Institute for Basic Research in Developmental
Disabilities on Staten Island, and Dr. Lorraine Flaherty of the State Health Department
in Albany. In addition, "[e]ight expert witnesses on DNA technology who testified in the
case have agreed with the conclusions of the statement," said Dr. Lander. Id. at B12, col.
5.
86. L.A. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § I, at 7, col. 5.
87. Edward Imwinkelreid, Professor of Law at the University of California at
Davis said, "[Castro] is extremely important because it highlights the importance of the
interpretive standard for evaluating DNA test results." Schmeck, supra note 82, at B12,
col. 1. "In telephone interviews [lmwinkelreid] and Prof. Randolph Jonakait, Dean of
Academic Affairs at New York Law School, each said the Bronx case was likely to have
major impact nationally." Id.
printing test by Lifecodes.18 Whether these problems were case-spe-
cific to Castro or might reflect more general problems in the method-
ology of the labs engaged in testing,8 is an issue which will
undoubtedly be debated across the country. Depending on how Cas-
tro is viewed, "[c]riminal convictions obtained with the use of ge-
netic testing may be reopened in the wake of [this] unusual New
York case."90
The pretrial hearing in Castro was expected to end on May 26,
1989, and a ruling was anticipated in mid-June.91 As of July 13,
1989, the judge had yet to make a finding on the admissibility of the
DNA fingerprinting test.92 One commentator predicted that "[Judge
Gerald Sheindlin] could make a general ruling on DNA fingerprint-
ing, perhaps saying that it is admissible if proper standards are set,
or perhaps taking a tougher line by saying that the technique is only
good enough to prove that two samples are not identical. Whether or
not the judge chooses to make a general ruling, he is widely expected
to decide that Lifecode's data are not admissible in this particular
case."
3
D. California Cases Introducing DNA Fingerprinting
The California case likely to provide the first ruling on DNA fin-
gerprinting in the state is People v. Axell.94 In Axell, the defendant
was linked to the murder for which she was charged by DNA analy-
sis of approximately sixty human hairs left at the crime scene. 95 Cal-
ifornia Attorney General Van de Kamp said Axell "will provide a
very clear test [of DNA typing's admissibility] because there is vir-
tually no other physical evidence, and conventional methods of foren-
sic evidence were attempted to no avail."'98
In a second California case, People v. Harris,97 a man was
88. L.A. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § I, at 7, col. 5.
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Schmeck, supra note 82, at BI, col. 6.
92. L.A. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § I, at 7, col. 5.
93. Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting: New Technique on Trial, 339 NATURE 408
(1989).
94. No. CR 23911 (Ventura County, Cal.). The prosecution and the defense have
completed their presentation of evidence in the pretrial admissibility hearing and have
submitted briefs on the issue. Oral arguments addressing whether the technique meets
the Kelly-Frye test were held August 7, 1989. Telephone interview with Ms. Carol Nel-
son, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Ventura County, Cal. (Aug. 1, 1989).
The DNA testing in Axell was done by Cellmark Diagnostics in Germantown, Md.
LA. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § I, at 7, col. 5; see also supra note 29 (listing the compa-
nies engaging in DNA testing).
95. L.A. Daily J., supra note 11.
96. Id.
97. No. 88F05854 (Orange County, Cal.). The pretrial admissibility hearing in
Harris will probably not begin until October 1989. The prosecutor does not expect to get
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charged with sixty-three counts of rape, five of which he has been
conclusively tied to through DNA typing.98 The testing in this case
was done by Lifecodes, the same company which performed the
DNA testing in Castro.9 The defense lawyer in Harris, John Bar-
nett, views Castro as raising serious questions about the technique:
"I have requested discovery of Lifecodes' statistical base, data and
calculations. This is not just a problem with a particular gel, or con-
tamination with probes, but a fundamental problem with their
calculus."100 If a searching challenge to the lab's methodology is
made in Harris, the case should result in a very important precedent
for the admissibility of the technique in California.
Two other cases in California are also underway to establish DNA
fingerprinting as admissible scientific evidence. In People v. Wilds,1 1
the defendant is charged with ten felony counts, including two rapes,
burglary, and robbery. 10 2 However, as in Andrews, the rape victims
did not see their attacker's face; thus, because the case against
Henry Wilds is "largely circumstantial. . . the use of the DNA evi-
dence could change the outcome of his trial.' 03 The prosecution ex-
perts in Wilds "have testified that there is between a one-in-66 mil-
lion and a one-in-180 billion chance that body fluid samples
recovered from the rape victims originated with someone other than
Henry Wilds."' 04 The defendant's attorney has opposed the use of
the technique on the grounds that DNA fingerprinting has not
reached the demonstrable stage required by Kelly-Frye, and that
there are too many unanswered questions. 0 5
Lastly, People v. Barney'0° will be the first case in the San Fran-
cisco area to test the use of DNA fingerprinting.' Ralph Barney
was accused of attacking a woman at knife point as she left a Bay
before a jury before 1990. Telephone interview with Mr. Dennis Bauer, Senior Deputy
District Attorney, Orange County, Cal. (Aug. 1, 1989).
98. L.A. Daily J., supra note II.
99. L.A. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § 1, at 7, col. 5; Schmeck, supra note 82, at BI,
col. 6, at B12, col. I.
100. L.A. Daily J., July 13, 1989, § 1, at 7, col. 5.
101. No. A816963 (Los Angeles County, Cal.).
102. Mallory, Valley Case to Consider DNA Testing Issue, L.A. Daily J., July 11,
1989, § 1, at 3, col. 2.
103. Id. at 3, col. 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. No. HKI0291 (Alameda County, Cal.).
107. Oltman, DNA Testing To Be Tested In Validity Hearing, L.A. Daily J., Feb.
16, 1989, § I, at 1, col. 2.
Area Rapid Transit train in January of 1989.10° Barney "is charged
with five felony counts, including kidnapping for robbery and at-
tempted rape."10 The investigators have "strong evidence against
the suspect. . . [but] they decided to proceed with a DNA test on a
semen sample found on the woman's clothes to make the case even
stronger.""'
E. Potential Applications of DNA Fingerprinting
The Andrews case represents the beginning of acceptance for the
process of DNA typing in the criminal law arena. 1 ' The appellate
decision in that case provides the only appellate court ruling on the
admissibility of DNA typing to date. 112 However, since Andrews,
several rape and murder convictions have been obtained in trial
courts across the United States with the use of DNA typing."'
Moreover, ambitious plans are underway for more expansive uses of
the new technique.
Officials hope that in the future, the DNA test will not only pro-
vide evidence for convicting defendants, but will also identify poten-
tial suspects. By establishing a computer database with the DNA
code of thousands of criminals which could be used by police who
have recovered blood or other samples from a crime scene, suspects
could be routinely identified." 4
Prior to Van de Kamp's announcement in January of 1989 that
DNA typing was ready to be introduced in California, such a
database was already being anticipated in the state. Blood and se-
men samples from 100 people a month who had been convicted of
violent sex crimes were being collected and frozen for future DNA
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting William Kleeman, a Deputy Alameda County District Attorney
who is prosecuting the case).
11l. Lewis, supra note 3, at 52.
112. However, a Florida appellate decision may not reflect what the California
courts would hold with regard to the evidence's admissibility because, if a relevancy stan-
dard is used, a more liberal view toward admitting evidence is usually taken. See supra
note 52.
113. DNA typing has been utilized in criminal trials in Florida, Oklahoma, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. These cases include: (1) The conviction of
Delmario Untrale Hill of sexual battery with great bodily harm, burglary with an as-
sault, aggravated assault, theft and false imprisonment on January 21, 1988. The DNA
test of the semen found in the victim's body matched Hill's, and conventional blood and
hair analysis were also performed which corroborated the identification. Assistant State
Attorney Doug Beam reported that the jury deliberated only two hours before returning
the verdict. (2) The conviction of Julio Zambrana in October 30, 1987 of second-degree
murder and third-degree assault in New York, New York. Although this case preceded
the Andrews case, it is not considered the first conviction based on DNA evidence be-
cause there were also eyewitnesses to the stabbing. Moss, supra note 6, at 68-70 (survey-
ing cases which have gone to trial using the technique).
114. Authorities, supra note 12, at 3.
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genetic code testing."15 Additionally, concurrent with the Attorney
General's January announcement, legislation was passed which
would further establish the database. 1" 6 Effective January 1, 1989,
the legislature amended the California Penal Code to expand the re-
quirements under which felony sex offenders must provide blood and
saliva samples for genetic typing." 7
In April of 1989, the Attorney General called for legislative ap-
proval of an even more expansive plan to "make California the first
state to establish a computerized genetic data base of everyone con-
victed of a violent crime.""' 8 The proposed legislation expands sam-
ple requirements beyond sex offenders, mandating that all people
convicted of murder, assault, rape, and other sex crimes give two
samples of blood and a saliva sample upon entering or being released
from prison. 19 If passed, this legislation would create a system
where the DNA analysis would be performed at one of four proposed
laboratories around California and fed to a central computer. The
information would then be made available to police departments,
similarly to conventional fingerprints. 20 The creation of this
database system, as well as the opportunity to use DNA typing in
general, is eagerly awaited' 2 ' by its supporters. However, use of such
115. Id. Crime scene investigators and field evidence technicians have been advised
that the use of DNA typing technology is imminent, so it is important to collect samples
of blood, semen, and hair roots from crime scenes. If the samples are properly collected
and preserved now, they can be used for comparison of DNA, as several years can inter-
vene between the time the evidence is collected and actual DNA identification occurs.
Sloan, What About DNA Identification?, IDENT-O-GRAm NEWSL., Official Publication of
the Cal. State Division of the Int'l Ass'n for Identification (Jan. 26, 1988) (unpublished
report) [hereinafter Sloan].
116. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 1.
117. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West Supp. 1989). The section provides that
"[a]ny person required to register under Section 290 [of the Penal Code] because of the
commission of or the attempt to commit a felony offense specified in Section 290 who is
discharged or paroled from a state prison, county jail, or any institution under the juris-
diction of the Youth Authority where he or she was confined, or is granted probation, or
is released from a state hospital to which he or she was committed as a mentally disor-
dered sex offender . . .shall, prior to discharge, parole, the granting of probation or
release, be required to provide two specimens of blood and a saliva sample to that institu-
tion or, in the case of a person granted probation, to a person and at a location within the
county designated for testing. The county shall make every effort to utilize one location
for testing a person under this section." Id. Previously, only an offender released or pa-
roled from a state correctional institution was subject to the blood sample and saliva
sample requirements. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989).
118. Reinhold, Genetic Tracking of Criminals Is Urged By California Official,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
119. Id. at 50, col. 1.
120. Id.
121. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 40.
a database goes hand-in-hand with admissibility of the technique in
the courtroom, and thus, the establishment of the computer system
also has its opponents.'22 In order not to delay such a system for
several months or years in California, claims that admitting DNA
fingerprinting is premature must be countered by strongly establish-
ing that the Kelly-Frye test for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence is met. 123
IV. ANALYZING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING
IN CALIFORNIA
A. The Kelly-Frye Test
The test for the admissibility of most evidence in California is
California Evidence Code section 350,124 which allows evidence to be
admitted if relevant. Evidence Code section 352,125 in turn, gives the
court the power to exclude relevant evidence.
The admissibility of novel scientific evidence, however, is governed
by a more stringent standard. It will not be admitted unless its scien-
tific basis and reliability are generally recognized by competent au-
thorities. 126 The reliability of the evidence derived from scientific
principles depends on three factors: (1) the validity of the underlying
principle; (2) the validity of the technique applying the principle;
and (3) the proper application of the technique on a particular occa-
sion. 127 In balancing these factors, courts have relied principally on
one of two tests to determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence.128
The first test is associated with Professor McCormick, and treats
the validity of the underlying principle and the validity of the tech-
nique as aspects of relevancy. Under this approach, the admissibility
122. San Francisco Public Defender Jeff Brown voiced concern that DNA finger-
printing had not yet reached a point of maturity and planned to speak before the State
Assembly's Public Safety Committee on July 18, 1989 against SB1408. The legislation
would amend the penal code to require genetic testing and appropriate approximately $3
million to set up a DNA identification program. L.A. Daily J., July 17, 1989, § I, at 4,
col. 1.
123. Id. at 42.
124. CAL. EvID. CODE § 350 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). The code defines rele-
vant evidence as that having "any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action."
125. Id. § 352. "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate
undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of con-
fusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."
126. B. WITKIN, supra note 23, § 864, at 829.
127. SCIENTIFIC, supra note 4, § 1-1.
128. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1980).
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of scientific evidence is governed by standard relevancy principles. 129
In Andrews, the first appellate court to uphold DNA fingerprinting,
a relevancy-type test was used.'
The second test, the one utilized by California courts and New
York courts in deciding Wesley and Castro, derives from Frye v.
United States.' In Frye, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that "the systolic blood pressure deception test has not gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psycho-
logical authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert tes-
timony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made."'3 2 The Frye court wrote only the following in their
two page opinion to justify their holding and a rule which has domi-
nated the admission of scientific evidence for more than fifty years:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 3
Thus, Frye imposes a more stringent standard than the McCormick
relevancy approach. "[I]t is not enough that a qualified expert, or
even several experts, believes that a particular technique has entered
the demonstrable stage, the technique must be generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community.' 34
129. Id.; see also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 203 (3d ed.
1984).
130. The test used in Andrews was a relevancy test "substantially adopted by the
federal Third Circuit in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)." Peo-
ple v. Andrews, 533 So. 2d 811, 846 (1988). This approach recognizes "relevancy as the
linchpin of admissibility, while at the same time ensuring that only reliable scientific
evidence will be admitted." Id. Where a scientific technique does not have a "track rec-
ord" in litigation, the Downing court stated that various factors may be looked at by the
court to determine a technique's reliability: "the novelty of the new technique, i.e., its
relationship to more established modes of scientific analysis, the existence of a specialized
literature dealing with the technique, the qualifications and professional stature of expert
witnesses, and the nonjudicial uses to which the scientific technique are put." Id. at 847
(citing Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238-39).
131. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
132. Id. at 1014.
133. Id.
134. Giannelli, supra note 128, at 1205. Professor Giannelli said: "In effect, Frye
envisions an evolutionary process leading to the admissibility of scientific evidence. A
novel scientific technique must pass through an 'experimental' stage in which it is scruti-
nized by the scientific community. Only after the technique has been tested and has
passed into the 'demonstrable stage' will it receive judicial recognition." Id. The tech-
nique is in the demonstrable stage when it is generally accepted by the relevant scientific
While the Frye test has undergone scathing attacks by commenta-
tors in recent ydars, 35 the test remains the rule in California
through the California Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the stan-
dard in People v. Kelly. 3" In Kelly, the court held that voiceprint
evidence was inadmissible. The only testimony as to the technique's
reliability was that of the head of a state police voice identification
unit. The court stated that establishing general acceptance under the
Frye standard involves a two-step process: "(1) The reliability of the
method must be established, usually by expert testimony, and (2)
the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly qualified as
an expert to give an opinion on the subject. Additionally, the propo-
nent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific proce-
dures were used in the particular case. ' '9 37
Kelly acknowledged that the Frye rule has been criticized as "too
conservative, often resulting in the prevention of the admission of
relevant evidence. '1 38 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed its alle-
giance to the rule, holding that there is "ample justification for the
existence of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of evi-
dence developed by new scientific techniques." '39
The Frye opinion had been criticized for failing to set forth a ra-
tionale for the general acceptance test.140 The Kelly court, in defend-
ing its adoption of the Frye rule, also responded to these concerns.
First, the court stated that the Frye rule, by requiring general ac-
ceptance of a technique in the relevant scientific community, assures
that "those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific
method will have the determining voice. ' Additionally, general ac-
ceptance in the scientific community assures that prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys alike will have a minimal reserve of experts available
to critically assess the new procedure. 1,12
Another justification for Frye is that it will promote uniformity of
decisions. Whereas individual judges' opinions may differ as to the
reliability of particular scientific evidence, substantial agreement and
consensus in the scientific community can be relied on by the
courts.14 3
community.
135. Id. at 1206-31, 1206 n.59.
136. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 28, 549 P.2d 1240, 1242, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 146 (1976)
(holding voiceprint evidence inadmissible).
137. Id. at 30, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148. But see infra notes 236-39
and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
140. Giannelli, supra note 128, at 1206.
141. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (quoting
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
142. Id.
143. Id. This is in contrast to the relevancy test which would leave the admission
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Finally, the primary rationale expounded in Kelly for reaffirma-
tion of the Frye rule was one of the strongest criticisms against Frye:
the "essentially conservative nature of the test."144 The Kelly court
found this conservatism important because it results in a lag time
between advances and discoveries in scientific fields and their accept-
ance as evidence in court proceedings. 14 This lag time reduces the
presence of a "misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a
new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental na-
ture,"'' 4  which can "assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the
eyes of a jury."'14 Thus, by determining general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community before such evidence goes before the
jury, the Frye rule seeks to prevent the admission of new and possi-
bly unaccepted principles that a lay juror might trust blindly."'
The Kelly court found further justification for the conservative re-
sults of the test in that once a published appellate court ruling up-
holds admissibility under Kelly-Frye, the precedent so established
may control subsequent trials. This would be true until new evidence
was presented reflecting a change in attitude by the scientific com-
munity. 149 The possibility of such an adverse precedential effect has
prompted officials to recommend that attorneys proceed cautiously in
the introduction of DNA typing in California trial courts. 50
"[P]remature use of the new technique could result in a precedent
that would set back genetic fingerprinting's ultimate acceptance in
the state by months or years."151
Thus, in order to survive challenges to its admissibility in Califor-
nia, it is "vital" that the first uses of the DNA technique be in the
best cases.' 52 Commenting on the importance of strong precedents,
Van de Kamp said: "Every prosecutor who follows behind will be
eternally grateful for careful work by those who lead the way.' 53
Moreover, proponents of DNA typing should be aware that the
of scientific evidence to the discretion of the trial judge rather than the scientific commu-
nity from which the new technique emerges. See Giannelli, supra note 128, at 1204-05.
144. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (1976).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (quoting Huntingdon v.
Crowley, 64 Cal. 2d 647, 656, 414 P.2d 382, 390, 51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 262 (1966)).
147. Id. (quoting Addison, 498 F.2d at 744).
148. People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499
(1987).
149. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
150. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
151. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 42.
152. San Diego Union, Jan. 26, 1989, at A7, col. 1.
153. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 1.
Kelly-Frye rule may be at its most conservative in an analysis of
DNA typing evidence. In addition to the justifications outlined above
for the general acceptance standard, Kelly said that exercise of re-
straint in admitting new scientific evidence is especially warranted
when the identification technique is offered to identify the perpetra-
tor of a crime.154 As a technique characterized to provide virtual cer-
tainty in the identification of a suspect, DNA fingerprinting certainly
calls for this special scrutiny, especially when a felony conviction is
at stake.
B. The Admissibility of Electrophoresis Evidence, Predecessor
To DNA Fingerprinting
Like DNA typing, the principal forensic uses of electrophoretic
testing are in the areas of identifying perpetrators of violent crimes
or sex offenses fron traces of blood or semen and determining pater-
nity. 155 Electrophoretic testing of dried body fluids such as blood and
semen is also similar to DNA typing because it is based on genetic
markers. 156
Electrophoresis identifies individuals by testing red cell enzymes
and serum proteins.157 Like DNA, these genetic markers may be
found in blood, hair, and semen. 58 The enzymes and proteins are of
evidentiary value because the pattern of their molecular forms pro-
duced by the electrophoresis test varies from individual to individ-
ual.159 However, unlike DNA typing, this technique cannot individu-
alize a sample. DNA typing can provide positive identification
because rather than using serum enzymes or proteins as markers for
the genes that express these molecules, it is possible to examine the
DNA that encodes these genes directly. 6 '
Electrophoresis is a standard technique in biochemistry, but its use
in analyzing aged or dried blood stains has proved intensely contro-
154. "When identification is chiefly founded upon an opinion which is derived from
the utilization of an unproven process or technique, the court must be particularly careful
to scrutinize the general acceptance of the technique." Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 32, 549 P.2d
at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (1976) (quoting People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 85,
114 Cal. Rptr 708, 719 (1974).
155. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, § 205(B), at 618-19.
156. See SCIENTIFIC, supra note 4, § 17-8(C).
157. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, § 205, at 618-19.
158. SCIENTIFIC, supra note 4, § 17-8(C), at 594.
159. Described as a procedure by which blood protein molecules may be separated
by their electrical charge, electrophoresis basically involves placing a blood sample on a
gel medium in an ionized solution and subjecting the solution to an electrical current.
This causes the sample to separate and migrate onto the medium into patterns of bands
that can be fixed, dyed, and interpreted by an analyst. The location and number of bands
are clues to the identity of the enzyme or protein. The pattern is compared to known
frequencies of enzymes and proteins to confirm the identification of the genetic markers.
See id. at 595-96.
160. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 37, § 205(B), at 74.
[VOL. 26: 377, 1989] DNA Fingerprinting Evidence
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
versial.1' It has been predicted that the application of DNA tech-
nology to determine identity will also be controversial."8 2 Because the
two forensic tests are similar in both principle and the existence of
controversy surrounding their admissibility, the electrophoresis expe-
rience provides a sound framework for analyzing the "DNA finger-
printing" test's admissibility.
In People v. Brown,' 63 the California Supreme Court determined
that substantial controversy existed as to the electrophoretic testing
of blood and semen stain evidence. "Where that issue remains open,"
the court wrote, "the party offering the evidence has the burden of
proving in the trial court that a consensus of scientific opinion has
been achieved.'1 64 The prosecution in Brown failed to show such a
consensus when it presented testimony in the trial court of two crim-
inologists from the California Department of Justice. The witnesses
were not considered by the Brown court as qualified to state the view
of the relevant community of impartial scientists. The court also
noted that neither witness backed their opinion with relevant scien-
tific literature, and concluded that the trial record was "patently in-
adequate to establish scientific acceptance of the tests under Kelly!
Frye. "165
Where the trial record is considered inadequate, the reviewing
court may do an unaided review of the scientific literature in an ef-
fort to determine whether a fair consensus on reliability of a tech-
nique exists. 6 However, where the scientific technology under re-
view is considered highly technical, this course. of action is not
recommended.'"6 Because of the technical nature of electrophoresis,
the Brown court did not try to determine the consensus of reliability
surrounding the evidence.' 6 8 The court did not hold that electrophor-
esis of dried biological fluids and stain samples was not generally
accepted within the scientific community as a matter of law, but
they did send a clear message that a more persuasive foundation
would have to be established to admit the evidence in the future.169
161. Id. at 73. See generally Note, supra note 12.
162. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 37, at 74.
163. 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985).
164. Id. at 532, 709 P.2d at 448, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
165. Id. at 533, 709 P.2d at 450, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 534, 709 P.2d at 450, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
169. See id. at 534-35, 709 P.2d at 451, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 845; see also People v.Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 387, 245 Cal. Rptr. 52, 58 (1988) (Brown "did not decide
whether electrophoresis of dried biological fluids and stain samples was generally ac-
Three years after the Brown decision, two California appellate
courts found that' a more persuasive foundation for electrophoresis
evidence had been established under Kelly-Frye, holding the tech-
nique admissible. In People v. Reilly170 and People v. Morris,'7 ' the
main challenge to electrophoresis was not to the method in general,
but that a consensus of reliability did not exist for the method as
applied to dried, aged evidence samples collected from the crime
scene.
172
Through the testimony of the prosecutions' expert witnesses, the
Reilly and Morris courts found that a consensus of agreement ex-
isted as to the technique's reliability.173 In both cases, the prosecu-
tion presented the testimony of five experts as to the technique's reli-
ability.174 In Reilly, only one expert testified for the defense, 75 and
in Morris there were no defense experts.' 76 The thrust of the defense
expert's testimony in Reilly was that analysts could not properly ac-
count for "the deteriorating effects of aging, improper preservation,
and the presence of crime scene contaminants."'1 77 "However," the
court explained, "his criticism was repeatedly qualified by noting
that well-trained, competent analysts who use proper procedures and
are aware of the published literature warning of typing problems can
account for those possibilities ."17  Thus, although the witness indi-
cated some dissatisfaction with the number of independently verified
studies available, basically he thought the information obtainable
was sufficient to render electrophoresis test results acceptable, pro-
vided that analysts knew and properly utilized the information. 79
The defense in Reilly also challenged the qualifications of the
cepted within the scientific community but held that a Kelly/Frye foundation must be
provided prior to admission of such evidence."). Attorney General John Van de Kamp
cites electrophoresis as an example of the dangers of rushing new technology into court.
"It took three years [after the Brown court's denial of electrophoresis' admissibility in
1985] to re-establish the technique's validity." L.A. Daily J., Jan. 26, 1989, § 1, at 7, col.
5.
170. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 242 Cal. Rptr. 496, 500 (1987).
171. 199 Cal. App. 3d 377, 245 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1988).
172. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 59; Reilly, 196 Cal. App.
3d at 1136-37, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
173. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 60; Reilly, 196 Cal. App.
3d at 1153, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
174. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 56; Reilly, 196 Cal. App.
3d at 1144-47, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 507-09.
175. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1140, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
176. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
177. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1140, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 505. "The heart of Dr.
Grunbaum's testimony was his doubt whether analysts can accurately account for those
possibilities [of the deteriorating effects of aging, improper preservation, and the presence
of crime scene contaminants] and thus distinguish between reliable and unreliable re-
sults, or even testable and untestable samples." Id. at 1141, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1143, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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prosecution's experts to testify as to the technique's general accept-
ance. Specifically, the defense attacked the testimony of several of
the prosecution witnesses because they had a professional interest in
doing forensic electrophoresis work and were not research scien-
tists.l s° The court responded that a certain degree of professional in-
terest in a new technique must be tolerated if scientists familiar with
the theory and practice of the technique are to testify as to its gen-
eral acceptability.""'
Another aspect of Kelly-Frye challenged by the defense, in addi-
tion to the technique's ability to account for aging, environmental
and bacterial contamination, was that the prosecution failed to prove
the application of correct scientific procedures in conducting electro-
phoresis in Reilly and Morris.82 In holding that the tests were per-
formed correctly, the court considered such factors as the criminal-
ists' use of controls and published standards to interpret results, the
experience of the analyst, and retesting of the evidence. 8 3 The iden-
tification of enzymes and serum proteins through electrophoresis
"ha[s] moved from an initial position of mistrust of such evidence to
the present stage of taking judicial notice of the scientific acceptance
or acceptability of serologic and related tests."'184
C. Analyzing the Admissibility of DNA Fingerprinting
1. A Consensus of Opinion
The proponent of novel scientific evidence must first establish the
generally accepted reliability of the method, usually by expert testi-
mony.'85 Precisely what amounts to "general acceptance" has never
clearly been delineated. 86 People v. Reilly, the first appellate court
opinion to uphold the admissibility of electrophoresis, agreed with
180. Id. at 1139, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
181. Id. at 1140, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
182. See Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 55; Reilly, 196 Cal.
App. 3d at 1153-55, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
183. See Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1153-55, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
184. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, § 205, at 619. Professor McCormick notes,
however, that there is a difference of judicial opinion depending on whether the sample
inculpates or exculpates a suspect.
185. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
148 (1976). The court may also determine whether a technique is generally accepted by
looking beyond the trial record, examining California precedent, cases from other juris-
dictions, and scientific literature. This is because appellate endorsement of a technique
ends the need for case-by-case adjudication. See id. at 32-36, 549 P.2d at 1245-48, 130
Cal. Rptr. at 149-52.
186. Giannelli, supra note 128, at 1210-11.
opinions stating the Kelly-Frye issue as whether "a consensus of sci-
entific opinion hal been achieved as to the scientific technique." '18
General acceptability redefined in this manner, the issue becomes
whether a consensus or substantial agreement among the scientific
community exists as to DNA typing's reliability. In the Andrews
case, the defense attorney said: "We could not find a single scientist
who thought it didn't work." 188 However, since Andrews, serious
challenges to the technique have been made, and from a review of
the articles on the new technique and comparison of DNA typing
with the electrophoresis cases, acceptance of DNA typing will not be
without controversy in California.
The time which has elapsed in a pretrial hearing on a less sophisti-
cated form of blood analysis in California, over one year, exemplifies
the scrutiny which new scientific procedures undergo in this state.'89
In contrast, the pretrial hearing in the Andrews case lasted only one
day.190 Proponents of the evidence in California must expect to lay a
more persuasive foundation for DNA typing's admissibility than
needed in jurisdictions which take a more liberal approach to the
introduction of novel scientific evidence. One of the leading DNA
fingerprinting experts among California defense attorneys predicted
the following in 1988: "I'm not sure who the voice crying in the wil-
derness will be [against the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting],
187. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1134, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 500 (quoting People v.
Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 532, 709 P.2d 440, 450, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 843 (1985)). In
Kelly, the court at one point says that a substantial agreement and consensus suffice, and
in Brown, the court says that its responsibility is to conduct a "'fair overview' of the
subject, sufficient to disclose whether 'scientists significant either in number or expertise
publicly oppose [a technique] as unreliable.'" Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 31, 549 P.2d at 1244,
130 Cal. Rptr. at 148; Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 533, 709 P.2d at 450, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 844
(quoting People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 56, 641 P.2d 775, 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 266
(1982)),
188. Christian Sci. Monitor, April 12, 1988, at 3, col. I.
189. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44. The anticipated time lengths for DNA
fingerprinting admissibility hearings in California also reflect a more searching inquiry
into novel scientific evidence. For example, in People v. Barney (No. HK 10291), the
Alameda County case, Richard Iglehart, Chief Assistant District Attorney for Alameda
County, said that prosecutors plan to "put on an extensive Kelly-Frye hearing, since
there are no appellate court decisions in California on this issue ... [and] include a
fairly long and complicated procedure for admission of evidence from a new scientific
area." L.A. Daily J., Feb. 16, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 2. In addition, the New York experi-
ence in People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1988), where the admissibility hearing
lasted over six months from its commencement on December 11, 1987 until the opinion
was rendered on July 15, 1988, resulting in "a transcript of over a thousand pages," id.
at 645, and in People v. Castro, where the admissibility hearing lasted 15 months, L.A.
Daily J., July 13, 1989, § I, at 7, col. 5, indicate that in a Frye jurisdiction prosecutors
must expect to establish a more extensive foundation.
190. See Lewis, supra note 3, at 50. Attorney General John Van de Kamp's ge-
netic fingerprinting watchdog, Frederick Millar, supervising deputy attorney general in
San Diego, also "notes that the entire trial transcript from some of the cases in other
states in which genetic fingerprinting has been introduced in court ha[ve] [sic] run less
than 100 pages .. " Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
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but I'm sure it will be somebody."' 191 Since then, a clearer picture
has been drawn of the technique's opponents and their reasons for
asserting that DNA fingerprinting does not yet meet Kelly-Frye.'92
Electrophoresis was developed in the late 1960s, 93 and although
in early electrophoresis cases the evidence was successfully intro-
duced,'" the California Supreme Court in Brown positioned itself
with those courts adopting a more skeptical attitude toward this
technique. 95 Electrophoresis experienced a considerable lag time,
then, between its discovery and eventual admissibility in California
in Reilly. 96 The Kelly court set forth the delay between the discov-
ery of a new technique and its admissibility into evidence as one of
the primary justifications for the Frye rule. 97 Since DNA finger-
printing was developed in 1985, it has not yet experienced the same
degree of lag time as electrophoresis did before its acceptance in
California appellate courts. An expert in the Andrews case testified
in the pretrial hearing to the technique's general acceptability as fol-
lows: "We do it routinely, roughly five to ten times a day in my
laboratory... and it's done on a similar basis in laboratories around
the world."'9 8 However, using a methodology under laboratory con-
ditions can produce different results than those in the field.'99
The effect of the variable conditions of the crime scene on electro-
phoresis test results was one of the main challenges to the technique
in Reilly and Morris 00 The defendants opposed the field-readiness
of the technique.201 Indeed, forensic scientists express similar con-
191. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
192. See generally Lander, supra note 82; Thompson & Ford, supra note 25.
193. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 531, 709 P.2d 440, 449, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834,
842 (1985).
194. SCIENTIFIC, supra note 4, § 17-8(C), at 600.
195. See id. at 601.
196. Electrophoresis was developed in the late 1960s. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 531,
709 P.2d at 449, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 646. However, it was at least 18 years before it was
held admissible in California (People v. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 242 Cal. Rptr.
496 (1987), was the first appellate court decision in the state to hold admissible electro-
phoretic evidence).
197. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149 (1976).
198. Lewis, supra note 3, at 50. David Housman, a molecular biologist at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, was prosecution expert witness in the Andrews case.
Id. at 47, 50; see People v. Andrews, 533 So. 2d 841, 848 (1988).
199. See Dodd, supra note 1, at 5-6 ("The technique, however, has yet to be tested
and assessed for application in actual casework. How easily DNA fingerprinting can be
assimilated in a routine crime laboratory remains to be established.").
200. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
201. See Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1136, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
cerns about the DNA test's effectiveness in the uncertain conditions
of a crime scene.20 2 While the technique may well be infallible
"under ideal laboratory conditions using ample and pristine samples,
.. . [t]he probability of two people having the same DNA print
under these circumstances is not, ultimately, a meaningful statis-
tic. ' '20 3 John Hicks, head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
serology unit, in January of 1988 said: "We're very excited about it
...but the fact is, we can't do it in crime laboratories now. We've
only done a limited number of tests yet. So we can't say with abso-
lute certainty that [the technique] works on different sizes of stains,
aged stains, and putrefied stains."20'
At that time, research was being done by the F.B.I. and other
forensic scientists on these environmental variables.205 Apparently
the FBI's testing resolved favorably the issue of how crime scene
variables affect the DNA fingerprinting process. After a year of re-
search on the process which concluded in December of 1988, the
Bureau is "now doing DNA profiling routinely every day," and ac-
cepting samples from law enforcement agencies across the country
for use "in violent personal crimes with a specific suspect, or serial
rapes or child molestations without a suspect."20 6 Additionally, test-
ing was underway by the Bureau so that it could formulate its own
statistics on the technique's reliability.0 7 A major concern of law
enforcement officials is that most of the research on the DNA test
has been done by private labs which have a proprietary interest in
their findings. These private firms, for the most part, have not put
the technology through independent validation studies. 208 Without
more independent validation of the technique's reliability, or disclo-
sure by private firms of their own studies, the relevant scientific com-
munity cannot evaluate the technique, and consequently, general ac-
ceptance is difficult to establish.209 Bringing the technology into the
public sector for evaluation of the impressive claims made by those
202. See Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
203. Thompson & Ford, supra note 25, at 64.
204. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
205. Moss, supra note 6, at 70.
206. Malcolm, supra note 10, at Al, col. 1, at B8, col. 1.
207. See Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
208. Frederick Millar says that he is aware of only one blind validation study, of
700 hundred New Yorkers. However, with claims that the technique has the ability to
identify one print from billions of others, such a sample is too small to prove the test's
reliability. Michelle Terry, director of marketing for Lifecodes Corp., says that the ge-
netic fingerprinting firms have their own way of knowing that the technique works. The
results of the tests by Lifecodes which support their claims of the technique's identifica-
tion powers cannot be disclosed because that information is proprietary. Troubled Debut,
supra note 11, at 44.
209. See generally id. at 44; Moss, supra note 6, at 69; Sensabaugh, Forensic
Biology - Is Recombinant DNA Technolgy in its Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 393,
394-95 (1986); FBI Laboratory, supra note 2, at 18-20.
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private companies marketing DNA typing will aid in reaching a con-
sensus of reliability.
In People v. Reilly, the appellate court found unanimous agree-
ment among prosecution experts as to electrophoresis' reliability.
The defense expert was the "lone detractor" from this position.2 10
However, as People v.Castro illustrated, unanimity is not the posi-
tion with regard to DNA typing. An informal poll taken in Septem-
ber 1987 at a meeting of the American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors also showed a lack of consensus. Out of the eighty-seven
directors who were asked whether DNA testing was ready for use in
casework, only one-third of the criminologists pronounced it field-
ready.211 And, although it was reported in April of 1989 that the
California Association of Crime Lab Directors "evaluated the pri-
vate companies and endorsed their procedures," 21-2 in actuality "the
lab directors' investigation disclosed that two of the three aren't
nearly as accurate as they claim to be." 213
Research scientist George Sensabaugh, an expert witness for the
prosecution in Reilly, testified in that case: "There really is no ques-
tion among people in the field that this kind of evidence material,
that is the dried stains, can be typed reliably using electrophoretic
methods. 21 4 Sensabaugh has also been studying DNA typing, but
his evaluation of the scientific field's attitude towards that technique
is not as glowing. Although he thinks additional research on the
technique will prove, not disprove, its reliability, he calls for addi-
tional independent research to establish reliability.1 5 Like other offi-
cials and scientists, he expresses the forensic community's concern
that the research validating DNA fingerprinting has, for the most
part, come from companies in the private sector. He recommends
210. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1149, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
211. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
212. Thompson, The Myth of DNA Fingerprints, CAL. L., April, 1989, at 34
(quoting California Attorney General John Van de Kamp).
213. Two out of three private laboratories "came up with one incorrect match out
of 50 samples sent to each in a blind test of their abilities," said Margaret Quo, Chief
Criminalist in the Orange County Sheriff's Department Crime Lab. The two labs which
incorrectly matched samples were Forensic Science Associates in Richmond and
Cellmark Diagnostics in Germantown, Md. Lifecodes correctly matched all of the sam-
ples. In light of the impressive identification claims made by these labs, Cellmark claims
the odds of an incorrect match are 30 billion to one, and Forensic Science Associates
"that the chance of a false identification ... is several tens of thousands to one," but,
opponents argue that the labs' performance is unacceptable, "particularly since unrelia-
ble evidence could lead to an innocent defendant's conviction." Id. at 34-35.
214. 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1146, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
215. Moss, supra note 6, at 69.
that such research be published quicdy for critical evaluation by
other scientists.216 Sensabaugh predicted that it will be 1992 before
enough research and education have taken place for DNA typing to
be admissible in California under the Kelly-Frye test.217 Other offi-
cials say that less time will be needed before there is adequate docu-
mentation of the process to provide the general acceptance in the
scientific community. 21 8
It is difficult to predict whether, at this time, DNA typing has
found general acceptance in the relevant scientific community under
Kelly-Frye. Since the Castro pretrial admissibility hearing, the
stance of some experts seems to be that DNA fingerprinting will pro-
vide a "powerful tool for forensic identification," but, "there is an
urgent need for the scientific community to agree on clear guidelines
for the procedures and standards needed to ensure reliable DNA fin-
gerprinting. 21 9 However, there are certain guidelines as to what
steps should be taken when DNA typing is introduced in California
courtrooms.
The Forensic Science Research Unit of the F.B.I. Laboratory has
published a protocol for certification of DNA typing techniques.
"This approach should enable research scientists to establish the sci-
entific validity of DNA typing methods as they are applied to the
examination of evidentiary materials and directly address the Frye
standard . . . for admissibility of evidence."220
216. Id.; see also Sensabaugh, supra note 209, at 396. ("The stability of DNA in
evidence materials needs to be critically assessed.").
217. Lomhoff, supra note 48, at 9. Notwithstanding these observations, George
Sensabaugh was a prosecution witness in People v. Wilds (No. A816963), a Los Angeles
County case which has been continued until September 18, 1989. At that time the de-
fense will begin its case against the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting. Telephone in-
terview with Dino Fulgoni, Head Deputy District Attorney, Special Crimes Division, Los
Angeles County, Cal. (Aug. 2, 1989).
218. California Attorney General John Van de Kamp said in February of 1988
that "within a year or two his office may back use of DNA fingerprinting in a criminal
trial." Authorities, supra note 12, at 3; see also supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
219. Lander, supra note 82, at 505; see also Schmeck, Standards Urged for Ge-
netic Fingerprinting, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1989, at AI8, col. 2.
220. FBI Laboratory, supra note 2, at 19-20. The validation protocol steps, pub-
lished by the F.B.I. are:
1. Perfect the typing methods with fresh body tissues and liquids obtained and
stored in a controlled manner.
2. Using specimens taken from donors of known phenotypes/genotypes, evalu-
ate the reproducibility of the techniques both within the laboratory and be-
tween unrelated laboratories.
3. Establish population distribution data in different racial groups for the al-
leles detected by a given RE-DNA probe pair.
4. Prepare dried stains using body fluids from donors of known phenotypes and
analyze using the tentatively perfected typing methods.
5. If required, modify the typing methods to ensure that stain specimens ex-
hibit accurate, interpretable and reproducible DNA typing profiles that agree
qualitatively with the profiles obtained on liquid specimens.
6. Determine if the polymorphic patterns in dried stains change as a function
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The F.B.I. report says that the major focus in the validation of
DNA typing methods must be on the legitimacy of their applications
to human tissue and fluid specimens that were removed from the
body in an uncontrolled manner and might have deteriorated prior to
collection.2 21 This focus responds to the concerns of some scientists
that the results of DNA typing under controlled laboratory condi-
tions cannot be the basis for determining reliability in the crime
scene situation.22 These are the same types of concerns which were
eventually overcome in the electrophoresis cases. 2
The F.B.I. report says that the validation of DNA typing methods
will likely follow the same path electrophoresis took in establishing
its acceptance. 24 In Reilly, expert testimony established that: scien-
tific literature on electrophoresis was sufficient to inform a compe-
tent technician of problems with the technique; most crime labs al-
ready adhered to guidelines like those which the defense expert
suggested for electrophoresis; published protocols were available for
each marker system; and most labs had in-house training on the pro-
of storage time.
7. Determine if DNA isolated from various tissues and organs within an indi-
vidual yields identical typing profiles.
8. Expose laboratory-prepared body fluid stains to a variety of commonly-en-
countered adventitious substances to assess the impact of these substances on
DNA profiles.
9. Examine DNA profiles in nonprobative evidentiary stain materials as exam-
ples of stains that are likely to have been exposed to a wide variety of adventi-
tious substances and climatic extremes. Because all possible contaminants and
environmental conditions that might affect DNA typing profiles cannot be ad-
dressed experimentally, special attention will be directed to a comparison of
DNA profiles derived from victim's liquid blood versus victim's blood deposited
on typical crime scene substrata.
10. Determine if DNA typing methods designed for use with human specimens
detect DNA profiles in fluids and tissues from nonhuman sources.
11. Set up typing methods in the case-working laboratory for onsite validation
of methodology.
12. Publish results of experimental studies in peer reviewed journals and pre-
sent data at scientific meetings. (These mechanisms provide a forum for public
criticism of the methodologies.)
13. Train case-working unit personnel in all aspects of the performance of
DNA typing methods and interpretation of typing results.
14. Establish formal training sessions for, and engage in collaborative testing
procedures with, scientists in state and local forensic science laboratories. This
program will not only serve to broaden the base of laboratories capable of per-
forming the analyses, but also will demonstrate that the methods are techno-
logically stable.
221. Id. at 19.
222. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 25, at 64.
223. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
224. FBI Laboratory, supra note 2, at 19.
cedure 2 8 DNA typing will most probably be scrutinized to deter-
mine if similar conditions are met. Following steps similar to those in
the FBI report will allow the relevant scientific community to ex-
amine DNA typing and arrive at a consensus about its reliability.
This should lead California trial courts to hold DNA typing admissi-
ble as each case is presented with the same certainty as electrophore-
sis and will guard against challenges to the technique's admissibility
on appeal.
2. Proper Qualifications of Witnesses
The prosecution in Brown failed to establish a consensus of opin-
ion as to reliability in the scientific community on the admissibility
of electrophoresis. The prosecution's primary shortcoming in present-
ing their case was their failure to meet the second part of the Frye
test. It requires that the proponent of the evidence establish that the
expert witnesses are properly qualified to give an opinion on the
subject:
The witness must have academic and professional credentials which equip
him to understand both the scientific principles involved and any differences
of view on their reliability. He must also be 'impartial,' that is, not so per-
sonally invested in establishing the technique's acceptance that he might not
be objective about disagreements within the relevant scientific
community.226
The lesson to be applied to DNA typing from Brown is that in the
trial court, qualified expert witnesses must be used to show a consen-
sus of reliability. DNA typing, like electrophoresis, is a highly tech-
nical process and, if the expert's testimony in the trial record is defi-
cient, an appellate court is unlikely to review the scientific literature
to determine the evidence's general acceptability.221 7 An appellate
court's reversal on these grounds will delay further the acceptance of
the technique in California.
The Brown expert witnesses were considered "unqualified to state
the view of relevant community of impartial scientists [because of]
their identification with law enforcement, their career interest in the
acceptance of the tests, and their lack of formal training and back-
ground in the applicable scientific disciplines. 228 While the weak-
nesses of the Brown witnesses stemmed from both their lack of com-
petence to testify on the general acceptance of electrophoresis and
their lack of impartiality as to the technique, a problem for propo-
nents of typing may be finding impartial expert witnesses.
The fact that most of the research involving DNA typing has oc-
225. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1146-47, 1150, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09, 511.
226. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 530, 709 P.2d at 448, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
227. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
228. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 533, 709 P.2d at 450, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 843-44.
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curred in private laboratories presents difficulties in finding qualified
witnesses under Kelly-Frye.229 Some prosecutors fear that there are
insufficient credible witnesses regarding DNA typing, and that a
challenge to the evidence's admissibility would stand a good chance
of succeeding for this reason. 30
In Reilly, the defense challenged the prosecution experts as not
being "disinterested" parties for Kelly-Frye purposes. The court re-
sponded: "The important point with regard to disinterest is that [we
have] before [us] a broad range of backgrounds . . . to assess gen-
eral acceptance through [the witnesses'] combined testimony regard-
less of any shortcomings that any of them would have suffered as a
sole spokesperson for the general scientific community. "231
At this point, it might be difficult to bring disinterested witnesses
for DNA typing before the court because private laboratories domi-
nate the field. In Reilly and Morris, the combined testimony of re-
search and forensic scientists in the private and public sector com-
prised the relevant field of impartial witnesses under Kelly-Frye.
Their combined testimony qualified them to testify as to the general
acceptance of electrophoresis. 3 2 The court found there that self-in-
terest in the technique did not make the witnesses' testimony unac-
ceptable because: "[a] certain degree of 'interest' must be tolerated
if scientists familiar with the theory and practice of a new technique
are to testify at all." 3 Even so, until DNA typing is researched and
validated by public sector scientists, courts may consider competent
experts available for DNA typing to have more than a "certain de-
gree of interest. 21 34
An additional requirement under the second part of Kelly-Frye is
that the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct
scientific procedures were used in the particular case.235 Moreover,
the analyst performing the procedures, as well as testifying about
229. Troubled Debut, supra note 11, at 44.
230. Attorney General John Van de Kamp said in January of 1988: "Of the hand-
ful [of DNA researchers working in forensics], almost none are law enforcement person-
nel. They are all attached to private laboratories, which by the way, have a proprietary
interest in their own procedures." Id. However, in January 1989, Van de Kamp reported
that legislation was underway to create five regional DNA labs. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25,
1989, § I, at 4, col. 1. This should produce law enforcement personnel able to give testi-
mony about DNA typing.
231. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1140, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
232. Id. at 1144-47, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 507-09.
233: Id. at 1140, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 504 (quoting People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d
270, 275 (Mich. 1986).
234. Id.
235. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
them, must be properly qualified. "Essentially, this part of the Kelly!
Frye standard insures that the technique was performed reliably in
each particular case before the evidence can be put to the trier of
fact., 236
Recently, however, it seems that this requirement has been clari-
fied by the California Supreme Court. In People v. Farmer,237 the
court held in the context of footprint identification evidence that
"the Kelly-Frye rule tests the fundamental validity of a new scien-
tific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with which it is
applied. ' 238 And additionally, "[c]areless testing affects the weight
of the evidence and not its admissibility, and must be attacked on
cross-examination or by other expert testimony. "239
It is likely that Farmer will be challenged as dicta by opponents of
DNA fingerprinting. But, notwithstanding the interpretation given to
Farmer by California courts, the quality control of DNA typing will
still be open to attack in each particular case where the test is held
admissible. An associate scientist at one of the companies producing
a DNA test reminds experts to be humble in their statistical evalua-
tion of the certainty with which a DNA test can identify an individ-
ual because the DNA test is done by people, and people make
mistakes.240
It would seem that in the context of DNA fingerprinting, where
the complexity of the procedure might overwhelm a lay person, the
underlying rationale of Kelly-Frye would be best met by the demon-
stration of correct scientific procedures in the pretrial hearing. If ju-
rors lacked the knowledge to properly understand attacks on the
DNA fingerprinting testing in the case before them, the identifica-
tion claims asserted by the evidence's proponent may "assume a pos-
ture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of [the jurors]."24l
Crime laboratories have been criticized for their rate of error in
performing other tests, and it is feared "that such personnel would
not be able to adequately perform the sophisticated techniques re-
quired for DNA analysis. 242 The DNA typing process requires in-
tensive work and "both meticulous expertise and much experience in
the reading and interpretation of the bands that appear in the final
autoradiographs. '' 43 Additionally, "since the outcome in human
236. Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1153, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
237. 47 Cal. 3d 888, 765 P.2d 940, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1989).
238. Id. at 913, 765 P.2d at 956, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
239. Id.
240. Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 12, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
241. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144,
149 (1976) (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
242. L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, § I, at 3, col. 1.
243. Dodd, supra note 1, at 7; see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 25, at 64
(discusses the complexity of the procedure).
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terms is likely to be far reaching and since no confirmatory tests
using other independent systems are possible, it is surely essential to
duplicate each test. 244
In Reilly and Morris, the proponents of the evidence met similar
challenges with regard to the testing of the particular samples used
in each case. There, the courts were satisfied that proper procedures
were used by qualified personnel. 45 In order to meet the demands of
Kelly-Frye it is important that personnel be carefully trained to per-
form the DNA typing test and be aware of published standards as to
DNA typing. The FBI report includes in its guidelines for validating
DNA typing steps toward meeting this part of the Kelly-Frye test.
246
Technicians should be familiar with such guidelines and quality con-
trols in force before introduction of the technique.
V. CONCLUSION
The identification capabilities of DNA typing may be revolution-
ary in their applications. The "DNA fingerprinting" test will, at
best, provide virtually positive proof that a suspect did or did not
commit a crime, or, at worst, a reliable identification system for
blood, semen, hair, or skin scrapings. Additionally, with the addition
of DNA computer databases, a suspect may well be placed at the
crime scene.
The electrophoresis cases show that under Kelly-Frye, when the
proponent of "DNA fingerprinting" wants to introduce the evidence
in California: (1) there should be a body of research from various
sources substantiating the technique, which also alerts forensic scien-
tists and technicians to proper procedures and potential problems
surrounding it; (2) qualified experts in the relevant field should be
available to testify that the technique is generally accepted; and (3)
personnel performing the technique should be properly trained and
follow procedures generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community.
In order for the proponent of DNA typing to meet these objec-
tives, or for the opponent of the technique to effectively object to its
admissibility, knowledge of the recommended steps for validation of
DNA typing, such as those published by the FBI, is important.2 47
244. Dodd, supra note 1, at 7.
245. Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 383, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 59-60; Reilly, 196 Cal.
App. 3d at 1153-55, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
247. See supra note 220.
Professor McCormick wrote:
To deal effectively with scientific evidence, the attorney must know more
than the rules of evidence. He must know something of the scientific princi-
ples as well. While he can rely on suitably chosen experts for advice about
the more arcane points, he must have a sufficient grasp of the field to see
what is essential and what is unnecessary detail and verbiage if he is to
develop or counteract the evidence in the way that will have the most
impact. 248
The validation steps set forth by the F.B.I. give a framework to
the proponent and opponent of DNA typing for handling the scien-
tific evidence. The problems DNA typing faces in being held admis-
sible under Kelly-Frye go hand in hand with the fact that control of
the technique is in the private sector. In setting forth its approach to
the evidence's admissibility, the F.B.I. framework also responds to
these concerns. Additionally, the justifications for the conservatism
of the general acceptance rule set forth in Kelly will be met through
this approach.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike benefit from certainty of
identification. Thorough preparation before presenting DNA typing
evidence, as well as its use in the clearest cases, will ensure early and
enduring use of the technique for both sides. Undoubtedly, the DNA
typing test will undergo thorough scrutiny in California. California
Attorney General John Van de Kamp warned prosecutors to proceed
cautiously Nyith their use of DNA typing evidence, stating that he
worried someone would rush into court ill-prepared and, on appeal,
the admissibility of the technique would be overturned.249 Consider-
ing some of the problems identified for establishing DNA typing's
general acceptance under Kelly-Frye, a cautious approach to the in-
troduction of DNA typing is justified. This will secure favorable
precedents on appeal, upholding the admissibility of DNA typing ev-
idence, and improve the quality of justice with the availability of
such an innovative technique for identifying and exonerating
suspects.
APPENDIX
There have been two recent developments bearing on the admissibil-
ity of DNA fingerprinting: In the New York case of People v. Cas-
248. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, § 203, at 604.
249. L.A. Daily J., Jan. 25, 1989, § I, at 4, col. 1. Additionally, each time DNA
typing evidence is introduced in a different manner, e.g., a new type of specimen, a sig-
nificant variation in the age or size of the sample or a procedural variation in how the
test is performed, general acceptance of the technique will have to be shown by the pro-
ponent of the evidence. This is exemplified by Reilly, 196 Cal. App. 3d at 1127, 242 Cal.
Rptr. at 496, and Morris, 199 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 52. In the former
case, electrophoresis test results for dried blood stains were upheld while in the latter, a
different system to obtain electrophoretic test results, the "multi-system," was upheld.
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tro, 5° the use of DNA tests to demonstrate the inclusion of Castro
in a class of suspects was barred, and, in the California case of Peo-
ple v. Axell,2 51 the technique was held admissible for the first time in
the state. The ruling in Axell resulted in California's first conviction
based in part on DNA testing." 2
The Castro court utilized the Frye test of admissibility, but fo-
cused on the third prong of the test.253 The third prong asks whether
"the testing laboratory perform[ed] the accepted scientific tech-
niques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?"254
The court noted that some courts, "in guarding the province of the
trier of the facts,' 2 55 have said that this prong affects the weight of
the evidence and not admissibility, and therefore, have based their
Frye analysis on only the first two prongs of the test: whether the
underlying principle of the technique is valid and whether the tech-
nique applying the principle is valid.2 56
In contrast, the Castro court advised that caution in reviewing the
procedures utilized by a testing laboratory should be the focus of the
inquiry because of the complexity of DNA fingerprinting and the
257 Shopportunity for error. Judge Sheindlin disagreed with the proposi-
tion of other courts "that improper procedures and experiments will
automatically and clearly be revealed" 258 to the trier of fact.
Based on the three prong analysis, the court found that there was
"unanimity amongst all the scientists and lawyers as well, that DNA
identification is capable of producing reliable results"2 59 and "that
DNA forensic identification tests to determine inclusions are reliable
and meet the Frye standard of admissibility, ' 260 but, that the DNA
identification evidence of inclusion in the case, matching the blood
on Castro's watch to the victim's, was inadmissible as a matter of
law because the laboratory (Lifecodes) "failed in several major re-
spects to use the generally accepted scientific techniques and experi-
ments for obtaining reliable results, within a reasonable degree of
250. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 16, 1989, at 19, col. 3 (Bronx County, N.Y. Aug. 14, 1989).
251. L.A. Daily J., Sept. 15, 1989, § I, at 1, col. 2 (Ventura County, Cal. Sept. 13,
1989).
252. Id.





258. Id. at 20, col. 4.
259. Id. at 19, col. 4.
260. Id. at 20, col. 4.
scientific certainty. 26 1 Only the evidence of exclusion in the Castro
case, or that the blood on Castro's watch was not his own, was held
admissible as a question of fact for the jury.26 2
No appellate courts in New York have ruled on the admissibility
of the technique, and Castro is often cited as the first serious chal-
lenge to the admissibility of the technique in that state.263 While the
prosecution claimed that Castro was a victory for the state in that it
simply means that now when DNA evidence is offered the propo-
nents have to make sure that the scientists have "dotted all the i's
and crossed all the t's in making sure that the procedures they use
are viable and defensible," 264 Castro's defense attorneys are calling
for retrials of DNA cases. They think that if DNA testing is used at
all, it must meet the strictest laboratory standards.265
Many legal and scientific experts agree that such laboratory
standardization is necessary.266 While recognizing the revolutionary
nature of DNA fingerprinting, it is felt that "unless standards are
soon established there is a great risk that the credibility of this type
of evidence could be compromised through mishandling, mismanage-
ment and improper analysis. ' 67
In People v. Axell, Judge Storch determined after a lengthy pre-
trial admissibility hearing that DNA testing was admissible in that
case.26 8 This ruling resulted in the first conviction in California on
the basis of DNA typing.269
According to James Farley, one of Axell's defense attorney's, the
decision to waive the jury in that case was made because the scien-
tific evidence would have been more devastating in a jury trial be-
cause "[w]hen a government scientist testifies, his words somehow or
other attain a level that's almost God-like"270 to the jurors. Farley
urges defense attorneys to continue challenging DNA typing and to
develop their own pool of experts to testify about the technique. He
cites Castro as an example of the mistakes that the laboratories can
make, predicting that more and more companies are going to begin
marketing the DNA test.2 7 1 This proprietary interest could result in
biased experts which should be guarded against in the pretrial ad-
261. Id. at 20, col. 6.
262. See id.
263. See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text.
264. Anderson, DNA Evidence Questioned, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1989, at 18.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. Id. (quoting Tom C. Smith, associate director of the ABA's Criminal Justice
Section).
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missibility procedure. 2
Until an appellate court upholds the admissibility of DNA finger-
printing, proponents must continue to establish the general accept-
ance of the technique in each particular case. 73 For this reason, Pro-
fessor Imrinkelreid said that Axell was more important for its
psychological impact in upholding DNA fingerprinting following the
Castro decision, than for its legal impact.2 74
In Axell, the prosecutor said that a key component in the judge's
ruling was "his determination that the basic science of DNA testing
should be subject to the Kelly-Frye standard" but "that a jury -
not a judge - should decide how much weight to give the specific
results of a DNA test in a particular case. '2 7 Apparently, the court
followed People v. Farmer276 in deciding that the third prong was to
be left to the trier of fact, in contrast with the Castro ruling.277
As this Comment stated previously, it seems that the basic ration-
ale of Kelly-Frye would be undermined by upholding Farmer's rul-
ing that Kelly-Frye "tests the fundamental validity of a new scien-
tific methodology, not the degree of professionalism with which it is
applied" 278 in the context of DNA testing.
Because of the complexity of the procedure and the concerns ex-
pressed by scientists about the lack of standard laboratory proce-
dures for testing, the application of Farmer will likely be an impor-
tant issue in the pending California DNA identification cases in
California. The stakes involved with using DNA testing are high so
it is vital that this evidence does not "assume a posture of mystic
infallibility in the eyes of [the jurors] ."279 Standardized procedures
should be adopted and the proponents of DNA evidence should be
required to demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used
in that particular case, and that the analyst performing them and
testifying about them is properly qualified, before the evidence can
be put to the trier of fact.28
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